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2Abstract
Humans frequently create mental models of the future, allowing outcomes to be 
inferred in advance of their occurrence. Recent evidence suggests that imagining positive 
future events reduces delay discounting (the devaluation of reward with time until its receipt), 
while imagining negative future events may increase it. Here, using a sample of 297 
participants, we experimentally assess the effects of cued episodic simulation of positive and 
negative future scenarios on decision-making in the context of both delay discounting 
(monetary choice questionnaire) and risk-taking (balloon-analogue risk task). Participants 
discounted the future less when cued to imagine positive and negative future scenarios than 
they did when cued to engage in control neutral imagery. There were no effects of 
experimental condition on risk-taking. Thus, although these results replicate previous 
findings suggesting episodic future simulation can reduce delay discounting, they indicate 
that this effect is not dependent on the valence of the thoughts, and does not generalise to all 
other forms of ‘impulsive’ decision-making. We discuss various interpretations of these 
results, and suggest avenues for further research on the role of prospection in decision-
making. 
Keywords: impulsivity, decision-making, prospection, emotion, episodic foresight, episodic 
future thinking 
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3Cuing both positive and negative episodic foresight reduces delay discounting but does 
not affect risk taking
Humans have the capacity to simulate potential future events and to organise 
behaviour accordingly. This capacity has been called ‘episodic foresight’ or ‘episodic future 
thinking’ (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Schacter, Benoit, & Szpunar, 2017; Suddendorf & 
Moore, 2011; Szpunar & Radvansky, 2015), and it is of enormous functional significance 
because it enables people to plan and prepare for anticipated future possibilities (Pezzulo, 
2016; Suddendorf, Bulley, & Miloyan, 2018; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Many different 
aspects of decision-making involve accounting for such possible future circumstances, 
including intertemporal choices – in which sooner and later outcomes are pitted against one 
another (Berns, Laibson, & Loewenstein, 2007). 
Intertemporal choice and episodic foresight
Many decisions have consequences that emerge only after a delay, and these delayed 
outcomes may be, to varying degrees, integrated into decision-making mechanisms (Peters & 
Büchel, 2011; Story et al., 2013). Nonetheless, humans have a strong tendency to discount 
the value of future rewards relative to ones that are immediately available (Berns et al., 
2007). This tendency for delay discounting varies substantially as a trait between people 
(Peters & Büchel, 2011) due to factors such as genetic heritability (Anokhin, Golosheykin, 
Grant, & Heath, 2011; Sanchez-Roige et al., 2018), and various aspects of developmental 
history or current environmental characteristics (Pepper & Nettle, 2017). As a somewhat 
distinct aspect of impulsivity – sometimes called choice impulsivity (Dawe, Gullo, & Loxton, 
2004; Gullo, Loxton, & Dawe, 2014; Hamilton et al., 2015) – delay discounting in humans is 
perhaps best considered an index of people’s preferences for smaller, sooner rewards relative 
to larger delayed rewards when those rewards are in opposition. This is reflected in the 
measurement of the delay discounting construct, in which the standard instruments require 
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4participants to make forced choices between smaller but sooner and larger but later monetary 
amounts (e.g. Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999). However, observable delay discounting also 
varies within individuals (Lempert & Phelps, 2015) based on the framing of the choice 
question, current mood state, other contextual variables, and ongoing cognitions (Berns et al., 
2007). It stands to reason that ongoing prospective cognition focussed on the future might be 
particularly important in determining the prioritisation of delayed relative to more immediate 
rewards. 
Indeed, various lines of evidence have emerged recently to suggest that cueing 
episodic foresight can be sufficient to encourage preferences for larger, later rewards in 
intertemporal choice tasks (for reviews see Bulley, Henry, & Suddendorf, 2016; Schacter et 
al., 2017). In the first empirical studies on this topic, spurred by a theoretical article by Boyer 
(2008), participants completed modified intertemporal choice tasks to assess their preferences 
whilst simultaneously imagining personally relevant future events and undergoing fMRI 
scans. In Peters and Büchel’s (2010) study, participants made a series of choices, for instance 
between 20€ now and 35€ in 45 days, while being cued with an actual event they had planned 
for in around 45 days’ time. In the episodic cue condition, preferences shifted towards 
delayed rewards. A subsequent study observed a similar pattern of results (Benoit, Gilbert, & 
Burgess, 2011). The authors of these first studies suggested that the effect of episodic 
foresight on intertemporal choice was linked to a neural mechanism of functional 
connectivity between brain regions in the core network involved in episodic simulation and 
prefrontal hubs involved in valuation. 
Since those first investigations, associations between imagining the future and 
intertemporal decision-making have been reported in many other studies, and links have been 
reported to various other decision-making profiles and behaviours that collectively fall under 
the umbrella of “impulsivity”. For instance, cuing participants to imagine the future has been 
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5shown to reduce ad-libitum calorie intake in obese women and children (Daniel 2015, 2013), 
as well as healthy undergraduate women (Dassen 2016). Such cueing has also been shown to 
reduce hypothetical alcohol demand in alcohol dependent people (Snider 2016) and 
undergraduates (Bulley & Gullo, 2017). However, in both of these latter studies the effects 
were somewhat selective; affecting certain alcohol purchase demand indices, but not others. 
Similar effects have been reported in the context of the intensity of cigarette demand (Stein, 
Tegge, Turner, & Bickel, 2017) and actual cigarette smoking among samples of smokers 
(Stein et al., 2016). Given that delay discounting itself has been linked to a range of negative 
behaviours and outcomes from obesity (Amlung, Petker, Jackson, Balodis, & Mackillop, 
2016), to gambling (MacKillop et al., 2011; Wiehler & Peters, 2015), to lower life 
expectancy (Bulley & Pepper, 2017) – and is therefore considered an important trans-disease 
process (Koffarnus, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, & Bickel, 2013) – manipulations that can 
effectively influence this decision-making process are widely-sought. As a consequence, 
there has been considerable recent excitement about the potential role of episodic foresight in 
developing (early) interventions for impulsivity-related disorders, although this excitement 
has been hedged with ongoing discussion about the limits, generalizability, and transferability 
of any effects (Bickel et al., 2017; Bromberg, Lobatcheva, & Peters, 2017; Noël, Jaafari, & 
Bechara, 2017; Sze, Daniel, Kilanowski, Collins, & Epstein, 2015; Sze, Stein, Bickel, Paluch, 
& Epstein, 2017). 
The specific mechanistic interpretation of how episodic foresight might impact 
intertemporal choice has varied widely, from considerations about the potential of imagining 
the future in engaging higher-level psychological construal (Cheng, Shein, & Chiou, 2012), 
to the ‘expansion’ of the ‘temporal window’ of reinforcement information (Snider, LaConte, 
& Bickel, 2016), greater identification or concern for one’s ‘future self’ (O’Connell, 
Christakou, & Chakrabarti, 2015), the extension of ‘temporal attention’ (Kaplan, Reed, & 
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6Jarmolowicz, 2016), and the importance of framing effects (Jenkins & Hsu, 2017). In most 
cases, however, there is a common theoretical foundation suggesting that positive simulations 
of the future should lead to reduced discounting rates because the emotions engendered by 
these simulations can act as a ‘motivational brake’ on immediate preferences (Boyer, 2008). 
For instance, imagining a future payoff may provide a sufficient reinforcement to motivate 
goal pursuit at the expense of shorter-term alternatives. This is because imagining an 
emotional future event can trigger emotions in the here-and-now, “as if” the event were really 
occurring (Damasio, 2009; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007) – allowing people to anticipate the 
delayed value of their current patience. Indeed, there are a number of reasons to believe that 
the relationship between episodic foresight and intertemporal decision-making might 
ultimately depend on the emotional valence of the thoughts, including the catalogue of 
differences between the processes and consequences of positively and negatively valenced 
foresight (see Barsics, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2015; de Vito, Neroni, Gamboz, 
Della Sala, & Brandimonte, 2014). 
The anticipation of negative, harsh, dangerous or uncertain future environments or 
scenarios might be expected to lead to a preference for immediate rewards inasmuch as one 
expects that the delayed reward is unlikely to materialise in such circumstances (Frankenhuis, 
Panchanathan, & Nettle, 2016). In fact, one of the ultimate evolutionary explanations for 
delay discounting is that the future is uncertain, which might prevent one from being able to 
capitalize on delayed rewards (Bulley & Pepper, 2017). For example, in ecology, 
‘interruption risks’ refer to the possibility that rewards might be lost before they can be 
obtained (Henly et al., 2008; Stephens, 2002), and an organism’s death, of course, eliminates 
its ability to capitalise on delayed rewards (Daly & Wilson, 2005; Pepper & Nettle, 2013). 
Accordingly, anticipating future dangers, or one’s death, may therefore engender ‘impulsive’ 
decision-making as a response to the likelihood that the future reward will not materialise, or 
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7that one will not be around to receive it (Bulley, Pepper, & Suddendorf, 2017; Santos & 
Rosati, 2015). In other words, there is good reason to suspect that decision-making profiles 
that have been labelled ‘impulsive’ are actually adaptive in certain circumstances, and this 
extends from behavioural ecology into various other domains in daily living, for instance in 
entrepreneurial endeavours where it is important to capitalize on fleeting opportunities (Gullo 
& Dawe, 2008). Thus, while impulsivity has been called “a predisposition toward rapid, 
unplanned reactions to internal or external stimuli without regard to the negative 
consequences of these reactions to the impulsive individual or to others” (Moeller, Barratt, 
Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann, 2001), at least in some domains the ‘choice impulsivity’ 
pattern of behaviour might be generated not only by impulsivity per se, but by careful 
deliberation (see also Brezina, Tekin, & Topalli, 2009; Dickman, 1990). 
Several lines of empirical evidence hint at the possibility that episodic foresight might 
affect delay discounting selectively depending on the content or valence of the thoughts. For 
instance, visualisation abilities (considered key to imagining future events in sufficient detail 
to generate the effect on delay discounting) have been found to correlate with steeper delay 
discounting (Parthasarathi, McConnell, Luery, & Kable, 2017), even though one study on 
adolescents found the vividness of episodic foresight imagery to correlate with reduced delay 
discounting elsewhere (Bromberg, Wiehler, & Peters, 2015). In addition, a recent study found 
no association between delay discounting and model-based control (a formalisation thought 
to reflect the mechanism underpinning scene-construction and future event simulation) 
(Solway, Lohrenz, & Montague, 2017). Higher levels of explicit worry (negatively-valenced 
mental representations of future threat events) have been found to correlate with increased 
delay discounting (Worthy, Byrne, & Fields, 2014), as has imagining a stressful upcoming 
event (Lempert, Porcelli, Delgado, & Tricomi, 2012). There have also been two studies that 
directly examined the effect of negatively-valenced episodic foresight on intertemporal 
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8choice, both of which found that imagining negative future scenarios generally encouraged 
choices of smaller, sooner rewards (Liu, Feng, Chen, & Li, 2013; Zhang, Peng, Qin, Suo, & 
Feng, 2018). However, this effect has only been studied twice, in small samples. By contrast, 
research on the relationship between delay discounting and positively valenced episodic 
foresight has been studied more than twenty times with largely homogenous results.
Risk-taking
In some regards, intertemporal choice and risk-taking can be grouped together under 
the construct of ‘impulsivity’, given that in both decision-making domains there exists the 
opportunity to prioritise immediate or potential delayed consequences. For instance, “risky” 
alcohol use involves trade-offs between immediate benefits (e.g. tension-reduction, pleasure) 
and potential large long-term negative consequences (e.g. health deterioration, costs to 
personal relationships). Other risk-taking behaviours including sexual promiscuity, violence 
and crime have a similar payoff structure, with high variance in potential outcomes – 
including trade-offs between immediate, highly rewarding outcomes and delayed, highly 
costly ones (Mishra, 2014; Mishra, Hing, & Lalumiere, 2015). Researchers are currently 
assessing the similarities and differences between the delay discounting and risk-taking 
constructs (Amir & Jordan, 2017; e.g. Luckman, Donkin, & Newell, 2017; Mishra & 
Lalumière, 2011). For example, risk-taking behaviour is often studied in the context of 
potential resulting punishments or harms (Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 2003) 
whereas delay discounting is usually studied in the context of potential delayed rewards or 
benefits. There are a number of other key differences (Holt, Green, & Myerson, 2003), with 
the underlying personality variables that relate to each kind of decision process probably also 
being somewhat distinct – as evinced for example by the lack of significant correlations 
between common assessment tools (e.g. Xu, Korczykowski, Zhu, & Rao, 2013). 
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9Whether or not episodic foresight affects impulsivity other than the kind expressed in 
strictly constrained intertemporal choice situations is of interest given the promise of such 
manipulations in modifying various real-world ‘impulsive’ behaviours such as overeating or 
alcohol abuse (e.g. O’Neill, Daniel, & Epstein, 2015; Sze et al., 2017). While there have been 
some initial attempts to explore the potential influence of episodic foresight on probability 
discounting – which has analogues to risky behaviour (Kaplan, Reed, et al., 2016; Mok, 
2017; Monroe, Ainsworth, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2017) – as well as some studies showing 
evidence that other mindset or framing manipulations can affect behavioural risk-taking 
(Keller & Gollwitzer, 2017), to our knowledge, as yet there has been no test of the potential 
effect of episodic foresight on behavioural risk-taking. Thus we sought to explore whether 
episodic foresight might affect behavioural risk-taking in a validated laboratory task – the 
balloon analogue risk task (BART), as it does in the context of laboratory intertemporal 
choice tasks. Given the conflicting evidence regarding the relationship between risk-taking 
and delay discounting, our analyses on this front were exploratory. 
The present study
In the present study we therefore had two main aims. First, we aimed to replicate the 
effects of cuing positive and negative episodic foresight on delay discounting using a 
considerably larger sample than in prior studies. Second, we aimed to explore the effects of 
emotional episodic foresight on behavioural risk-taking for the first time. Participants 
completed modified laboratory measures of an intertemporal choice task (the 27-item 
Monetary Choice Questionnaire), and risk-taking (the BART). During both tasks, participants 
were prompted to imagine episodic future events or engage in neutral mental imagery. We 
hypothesized that cuing positively-valenced episodic foresight would result in lower delay 
discounting than a control imagery condition, whereas cuing negatively-valenced episodic 
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10
foresight would result in higher delay discounting than a control imagery condition, in line 
with previous research. We were also interested in exploring the effect of positively- and 
negatively-valenced episodic foresight on risk-taking. All hypotheses were pre-registered 
through the Open Science Framework, here: https://osf.io/rfndu/.
Method
Participants
Participants were 301 undergraduate students who took part in the study for course 
credit. The study was approved by the University of Queensland School of Psychology 
Human Research Ethics Committee. Some participants were excluded from all analyses for 
inconsistent responding on the intertemporal choice questionnaire (consistency scores lower 
than 75%; n = 4), for discussion see Lemley et al. (2016) and Kaplan et al. (2016). Thus, the 
final sample comprised 297 participants (mean age = 19.72, SD = 4.03) of which 200 (67%) 
were female. 
Design and procedure
Participants attended a single session that lasted approximately one hour. They were 
allocated randomly by the computer program (and blindly to the experimenter) to one of 
three groups: (1) positive episodic foresight, (2) negative episodic foresight, and (3) control 
(non-temporal) mental imagery. Participants first completed a visual analogue mood scale 
upon entering the lab, followed by a modified intertemporal choice task to assess delay 
discounting and the BART to assess risk-taking. These latter two assessments were 
counterbalanced. During both of these tasks, participants were presented with cues to engage 
in positive future, negative future, or neutral non-temporal mental imagery, depending on 
their experimental condition.  Participants also completed the self-report Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale-Brief (BIS-Brief) (Steinberg, Sharp, Stanford, & Tharp, 2013), Penn-
State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), and 
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11
Patient Health Questionnaire-9 depression inventory (PHQ-9) (Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 
2001), about which there were no explicit pre-registered hypotheses. At the end of the 
session, participants rated various aspects of their mental imagery during the tasks and 
provided demographic information. Details of all measures are as follows.  
Measures and Manipulations
Episodic foresight manipulation:  The episodic foresight event cue words were 
derived from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) list (Bradley & Lang, 1999). 
Ten words for each of the positive, negative and neutral valence conditions were selected 
(See Table 1). Short event descriptions were created with the selected words as the central 
component. Words were selected that enabled events to be created that were both plausible 
and simple, but also vividly imaginable (i.e. words were either action verbs or concrete 
nouns). The positive events were broadly those that participants would be likely to look 
forward to, while negative events concerned future threats (Blanchard, Hynd, Minke, 
Minemoto, & Blanchard, 2001). The neutral events were everyday activities without a 
temporal component. All of the event cues used in this experiment and ANEW valence 
ratings can be found in Table 1.  
Participants were provided with a list of these 10 events (positive, negative or neutral 
depending on condition) and asked to select the 5 that were most relevant to them personally, 
in order to promote autobiographical episodic imagery during the task. The 5 events 
considered highest in personal relevance were then used as cues in the remainder of the 
experiment. Based on instructions for encouraging vivid imagination (D’Argembeau, Xue, 
Lu, Van der Linden, & Bechara, 2008; Damasio et al., 2000) participants were instructed 
before the task that when they saw the imagination instruction, they should: “take a few 
moments to imagine yourself experiencing the event as vividly as possible. Produce detailed 
images of the events being imagined and concentrate on those images attentively. Include as 
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12
much emotional and background detail as you can (e.g. where are you, what do you do, who 
is with you, what does it look and sound like, how does it make you feel?)”. During the task, 
participants were instructed to imagine the events taking place at a certain amount of time in 
the future for the positive and negative future event cues (details in the ‘intertemporal choice’ 
section below). The neutral condition instructions made no mention of the temporality of the 
events; instead, participants were instructed to simply imagine this event, “as it would 
typically unfold, rather than remembering a particular occasion when you did this activity” 
(D’Argembeau et al., 2008). During the task, the imagination component was self-paced. 
--- Insert Table 1 about here ---
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Intertemporal choice
The Monetary Choice Questionnaire (MCQ) (Kirby, 1999) presents participants with 
27 choices between a smaller but sooner amount of money and a larger but later amount 
available after a certain delay (7 to 182 days). The task has been shown to have high test-
retest reliability (Kirby, 2009). The MCQ can be used to calculate a general delay 
discounting parameter (‘k’) for each participant, such that greater k values represent steeper 
delay discounting (see ‘data analysis’, below). Episodic event cues were inserted into the 
code of the computerized task, to be presented before each decision in a manner that 
synchronized the temporal distance to both the possible future event and the delayed reward. 
For example, participants would be presented with a cue to imagine an event taking place in 
around 6 months before making a choice about a reward that was delayed by approximately 
that same amount of time. The event cues were presented on a screen preceding each of the 
27 choice questions. Similarly to previous studies on the effect of foresight on intertemporal 
choice (e.g. Lin & Epstein, 2014), participants were instructed that they did not need to relate 
their decision to the event they imagined, but just to picture the event actually happening 
before making their choice. The event cues were tailored such that the time of occurrence 
approximated the receipt of the delayed intertemporal choice option. Figure 1 (top) shows the 
trial order and choice format for the MCQ. Table 2 shows a full list of the MCQ items and 
the groupings of the questions for the sake of the foresight manipulations.
--- Insert Table 2 about here ---
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Risk Taking: 
Risk taking was measured with a computerised version of the Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task (BART), (Lejuez et al., 2002) which was presented using E-Prime (Pleskac & 
Wershbale, 2014). Scores on the BART have been shown to predict risk-taking behaviours in 
a range of domains including unsafe driving, unprotected sex, gambling, stealing and 
substance use (Aklin, Lejuez, Zvolensky, Kahler, & Gwadz, 2005; Lejuez et al., 2002, 2003; 
Wallsten, Pleskac, & Lejuez, 2005), and the measure has been shown to have adequate test-
retest reliability (White, Lejuez, & de Wit, 2008). 
In each trial of the task, participants were presented with an image of a balloon, which 
they could ‘inflate’ by pressing the “F” key. Each button press slightly inflated the balloon 
and earned the participant 10 points. These points would accumulate during the trial but 
would all be lost if the balloon ‘popped’. At any time during a given trial, the participant 
could choose to stop inflating the balloon before it popped, and opt instead to retrieve the 
money thus far collected on that trial by pressing the “J” key, moving it to a permanent 
‘bank’. The BART was programmed such that the optimal average number of pumps was 64 
(for more details see Pleskac and Wershbale, 2014, p146). The ‘total points’ accumulated 
thus far in the permanent bank was displayed throughout the task on the right hand side of the 
screen alongside the points accumulated during the current trial. Event cues were presented 
on a separate screen preceding each balloon (before the fixation cross). Because the BART 
lacks an explicit temporal component, the event cues were entered with the same temporal 
specifications as the intertemporal choice questionnaire, but in an arbitrary order. On the 
event cue screen participants were instructed to ‘press space to continue’, which would take 
them to the next trial of the task. Before the experimental trials began, participants were 
given a single practice trial where they were not cued to imagine anything. Figure 1 (bottom) 
shows the trial order and choice format for the BART. 
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--- Insert Figure 1 about here ---
Current Affect: Participants completed a visual-analogue mood scale (a slider 
ranging continuously from sad to happy) upon entering the lab such that higher scores were 
indicative of more positive affect. This measure was included to control for any possible 
effect of participants’ baseline affective state on the measures of interest because there is 
some evidence for general mood effects on delay discounting (e.g. Hirsh, Guindon, 
Morisano, & Peterson, 2010).  Event cue ratings: At the end of each session, participants 
rated the vividness, emotionality and personal relevance of their imagination of each event 
cue on scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very).  Other measures: General levels of worry were 
assessed with the Penn-State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ), a 16-item self-report 
questionnaire that measures the intensity of worry (Meyer et al., 1990). Severity of 
depression was assessed with the PHQ-9 depression inventory, a 9-item self-report 
questionnaire of depressive symptom frequency (Kroenke et al., 2001). Trait impulsivity was 
measured with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-Brief (Steinberg et al., 2013), an 8-item 
version of the longer BIS-11 (Barratt, 1959; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). 
Data analysis 
Hypotheses, measures, and our analytical plan were pre-registered with the Open 
Science Framework: https://osf.io/rfndu/. All statistical analyses were performed in R studio 
(R Core Team, 2008), including the following packages: apaTables (Stanley, 2017), dplyr 
(Wickham, 2016), ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009), lemon (Edwards, 2017), ggsignif (Ahlmann-
Eltze, 2017), psych (Revelle, 2015), reshape2 (Wickham, 2007), and Rmisc (Hope, 2013). 
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The R script used for all data processing and analyses is available as an electronic supplement 
to this paper, as is the dataset and an information sheet about the included variables. 
Monetary Choice Questionnaire. A publicly available spreadsheet from Kaplan et al. 
(2014) was used to derive a temporal discounting (‘k’) value for each participant from the 
MCQ response data (Kaplan, Amlung, et al., 2016). The K value is a free parameter of a 
modelled hyperbolic discounting equation. A greater k value is indicative of steeper temporal 
discounting, (for individuals with a higher k value, rewards more quickly lose their subjective 
value with additional delays), and this acted as the primary outcome measure for the task. 
The data were normalized by a log-transformation of the raw values in accordance with our 
pre-registered plan and recommendations by Kirby & Maraković (1996). The MCQ has 27 
questions, each with a different ‘k-index’ used to calculate the indifference point (and thus 
overall k value) for each participant. These question-level discounting-rate parameters (k-
index) range from 0.00016 to 0.25 and include rewards of three magnitudes: ‘small’, 
‘medium’, and ‘large’. Table 2 contains a summary of all the intertemporal choice questions, 
including information about their respective k-indices and their order of presentation. We 
chose to analyse the MCQ data overall rather than for each magnitude separately as is 
sometimes done because we had no a-priori hypotheses about the effects of episodic foresight 
on discounting as a function of magnitude. Note that removing from analysis the participants 
who always chose the larger, later reward or always chose the smaller, sooner reward made 
no difference to the analyses below, and thus results are reported without excluding these 
participants. 
Balloon-Analogue Risk Task (BART): Scores were calculated as the average number 
of pumps per trial on trials in which the balloon did not burst (Lejuez et al., 2002), as is 
standard practice. The resulting adjusted pump scores approximated a normal distribution and 
were used in all analyses. 
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Inferential statistics. We created two linear regression models to test the effect of 
episodic foresight on both the MCQ and the BART1. We controlled for age, sex, and baseline 
affect in each model and included experimental condition as a dummy-coded categorical 
predictor. Some additional exploratory analyses can be found in the supplementary 
document, pertaining to the relationship between the MCQ and the BART, and the 
relationship between the MCQ and self-reported impulsivity. Controlling for BIS, PSWQ and 
PHQ-9 scores in the main models assessing both MCQ and BART as outcome measures did 
not affect the pattern of findings.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the main study variables. 
Event cue ratings
Participants rated that they felt significantly more negative when imagining the events 
in the negative condition (M = 2.37, SD = 0.70) than the neutral condition (M = 4.48, SD = 
0.58), t = 22.79 p < 0.001, and significantly more positive when imagining the events in the 
positive condition (M = 5.88, SD = 0.67) than the neutral condition (M = 4.48, SD = 0.58), t 
= 15.15, p < 0.001. Participants rated the event cue imagery as significantly more personally 
relevant in the positive (M = 5.62, SD = 0.73) than the neutral condition (M = 5.10, SD = 
1.16), t = 3.820, p < 0.001, and significantly less personally relevant in the negative condition 
(M = 4.7, SD = 0.95) than the neutral condition (M = 5.10, SD = 1.16), t = -3.32, p < 0.01. 
Controlling for this difference in personal relevance in latter analyses did not affect results. 
There were no differences in participants’ ratings of the vividness of their imagery between 
1 In a change to the pre-registered analytical plan we produced the analyses with regressions 
rather than ANCOVA for interpretability, but both analyses produce the same pattern of 
results. 
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the three experimental conditions. Figure 2 (middle row) presents the valence, vividness and 
personal relevance ratings separately for each experimental condition. 
Correlations between the event cue ratings were explored separately for each 
experimental condition, and are presented in Figure 2 (top row). Despite there being no 
average differences between conditions in the vividness of imagination, this variable was 
differentially correlated with valence in each condition in the expected direction. This 
correlation was of large magnitude in the positive condition, r = .62, p < 0.001, and negative 
condition, r = -.54, p < 0.001, and of moderate magnitude in the neutral condition, r = .33, p < 
0.001 (see Cohen, 1988). Figure 2 (bottom row) presents the relationships between the 
vividness and valence of the event cue ratings separately for each experimental condition. 
There was a similarly large positive relationship between the personal relevance of the events 
and the vividness with which they were imagined (0.55 – 0.67, all p < 0.001). Table 4 
presents descriptive statistics for the event cue ratings separately for each condition.
--- Insert Table 3 about here ---
--- Insert Table 4 about here ---
--- Insert Figure 2 about here ---
Effect of positive and negative episodic foresight on intertemporal choice and risk-
taking
Experimental condition as predictor was positively associated with log-transformed 
MCQ k values as outcome after controlling for age, sex, and baseline affect. Participants in 
the positive foresight condition (M = -2.35 SD = 0.64) were on average more willing to wait 
for the larger, delayed rewards on the MCQ than participants in the neutral condition (M = -
1.99, SD = 0.50), b = -0.36, [95% CI = -0.52, -0.19], p < 0.001, as were participants in the 
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negative foresight condition, (M = -2.28, SD = 0.61), b = -0.29, [95% CI = -0.45, -0.13], p < 
0.001. Table 5 presents the results of the regression with experimental condition as a 
categorical dummy-coded predictor with the neutral condition as the reference group. 
Analysing the data by the proportion of larger, later options chosen instead of k values 
produced the same results: on average, participants chose the larger later reward in 45% of 
the questions in the neutral condition, 55% of the questions in the positive condition, and 
52% of the questions in the negative condition. For ease of interpretability, the proportion of 
larger, later options in each group is therefore presented in Figure 3 (top middle) alongside 
log-transformed MCQ k values. 
Figure 3 (bottom row) presents the sample-level proportion of smaller, sooner 
rewards chosen (on the y-axis) for the varying k-indexes of the MCQ questions (on the x-
axis). It indicates that the greatest magnitude of difference between the experimental 
conditions and the control condition pertained to those questions with ranks ranging from 4 to 
6.  Increasing rank is associated with larger discrepancies between present and delayed 
options and increasingly shorter delays (see table 2). Thus, Figure 3 indicates that the effect 
of episodic foresight on delay discounting is greatest for those questions with moderate 
discrepancies between immediate and delayed options and with moderate delays, such that all 
participants almost invariably (a) chose the delayed option when it was much larger than the 
immediate option and available after a short delay, and (b) chose the immediate option when 
there was little difference with the delayed option accompanied by a long delay. 
Experimental condition was not associated with BART scores in a model adjusting 
for age, sex, and baseline affect, and the overall model was not statistically significant. There 
were no differences in the number of adjusted pumps in the BART on average between the 
experimental conditions, as illustrated in figure 3 (top right). Table 6 presents the results of 
the regression with experimental condition as a categorical dummy-coded predictor. 
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--- Insert Table 5 about here ---
--- Insert Table 6 about here ---
--- Insert Figure 3 about here ---
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Discussion
In this study, we assessed whether and to what extent imagining positively- or 
negatively-valenced future events influences intertemporal choice and risk-taking. We tested 
the hypothesis that imagining positive future events during an intertemporal choice task shifts 
temporal preferences towards delayed rewards, and that imagining negative future events 
shifts preferences towards immediate rewards. Results were consistent with the first 
hypothesis, replicating the finding that imagining positive personally relevant future events 
reduces delay discounting. However, our results were inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
negative threat-related foresight encourages greater discounting, as has been observed in two 
previous studies (Liu et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2018). Instead, we found that negative 
episodic foresight reduced delay discounting to a similar degree as positive episodic 
foresight. Furthermore, we observed no effect of imagining positive or negative future events 
on risk-taking in the balloon-analogue risk task. These findings will be discussed in turn 
below. 
The effect of foresight on intertemporal choice
In the present study, cuing positive and negative episodic future simulation increased 
the proportion of larger, later rewards chosen by 10% and 7% relative to control imagery, 
respectively. Although a number of studies have reported an effect of positively-valenced 
episodic foresight on delay discounting of a similar magnitude, this is the first study to report 
that negatively-valenced episodic foresight is associated with a similar reduction in delay 
discounting. We consider five possible interpretations of these effects below, after first 
comparing the current findings with two previous studies on the effect of negative episodic 
event cuing on delay discounting.
In both previous studies, episodic event tagging with negative future events (similar to 
the ones used in the current study) was associated with significantly increased delay 
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discounting relative to a neutral condition (Liu et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2018). It is unclear 
exactly why the current results diverge from these findings, but we note that the previous 
studies had substantially smaller sample sizes than the current one (N = 297, between-
subjects neutral imagery vs. positive foresight vs. negative foresight). In Liu et al. (2013), 
study one (N = 32) employed a within-subjects design to compare control vs. positive 
foresight, and study two (N = 31) employed a within-subjects design to compare control vs. 
negative foresight. Zhang et al. (2018) employed a between-subjects design to compare 
neutral prospection (n = 34) vs. positive prospection (n = 34) vs. negative prospection (n = 
32). Another difference in the design of the studies pertains to the control condition: Whereas 
Liu et al. (2013) used a passive control condition in which participants were not required to 
engage in prospection, Zhang et al. (2018) used an active control condition more akin to the 
present study in which participants were required to engage in neutral prospection. 
Otherwise, however, the experimental designs are highly similar (including in terms of the 
event cues, event ratings, laboratory choice task, and analytical approaches). It is worth 
noting, however, that the current study tested an Australian sample, while both previous 
studies examined Chinese participants. Thus, it is also possible that cultural differences may 
influence the way cued episodic foresight affects decision-making – though establishing this 
and potential underlying reasons would require dedicated studies. 
With respect to the effect sizes of the studies, Liu et al. (2013) reported a medium 
effect size (Cohen’s d = .56) of negative foresight on the proportion of immediate-to-total 
choices relative to their control condition, and a medium-to-large effect size (Cohen’s d = 
.67) of positive foresight on the proportion of immediate-to-total choices compared to their 
control condition. Zhang et al. (2018) reported a large effect size (Cohen’s d = .89) 
comparing the proportion of immediate-to-total choices between negative foresight and 
neutral conditions, and a large effect size (Cohen’s d = -.76) comparing positive foresight and 
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neutral conditions. The present study yields a medium effect size when comparing 
immediate-to-total choices between negative foresight and neutral conditions (Cohen’s d = 
.45) as well as when comparing positive foresight and neutral conditions (Cohen’s d = .63). 
Note again, however, that in the current study cued negative foresight reduced the proportion 
of immediate-to-total choices (reduced delay discounting), whereas in both previous studies 
cued negative foresight increased the proportion of immediate-to-total choices (increased 
delay discounting). We think the effect sizes reported by Zhang et al. (2018) are inflated 
because they used a between-subjects design with approximately 30 participants in each 
group. In contrast, Liu et al. (2013) used a within-subjects design with approximately 30 
participants and the present study used a between-subjects design with approximately 100 
participants in each group, and the effect sizes of these latter two studies are comparable. 
Regarding the effects found in the current experiment, the first explanation is that the 
future event tagging manipulation might engender a generic change in ‘future orientation’. 
For instance, Lempert & Phelps (2015) suggested that episodic future thinking “might serve 
to change time construal during choice”. A central tenet of Construal Level Theory (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010) is that future events are more ‘psychologically distant’ and are therefore 
‘construed’ more abstractly than present ones. Imagining future events in detail therefore 
changes the construal level of ‘future orientation’ to a higher degree of concreteness (Cheng 
et al., 2012). This in turn may have made the delayed option more attractive. This explanation 
appears to align with data from a recent study that showed actively manipulating construal 
levels – by encouraging future scenarios to be imagined with more concrete details – caused 
greater reductions in delay discounting (Kim, Schnall, & White, 2013). 
However, if this interpretation rests on the greater ‘future orientation’ brought about 
by construal level changes, it may be challenged by a recent finding that remembering 
positive autobiographical events also reduces delay discounting (Lempert, Speer, Delgado, & 
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Phelps, 2017) – though note that another recent study reported that there is no effect of 
episodic recollection on discounting (Daniel, Sawyer, Dong, Bickel, & Epstein, 2016). One 
way around this is to postulate that episodic memory affects discounting (if, indeed, this is 
borne out in further studies) because memories form the basis for future simulations – and 
that the function of memory is ultimately forward-facing (Bar, 2010; Klein, Robertson, & 
Delton, 2010; Lempert et al., 2017; Suddendorf & Henry, 2013). A problem with this 
conflation, however, is that despite the multiple convergences between memory and future 
simulation (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009; Schacter et al., 2012), they cannot be considered the 
same construct, with the same consequences (Klein, 2015; Suddendorf, 2010).   
Nonetheless, given the possibility that episodic recall also results in reduced 
discounting, and the present results indicate that the emotional valence of episodic foresight 
does not have a differential effect on discounting, the second potential explanation of the 
current data pertains to the psychological effects of deliberative thinking in general terms. 
For instance, Bar (2010) in a response to Peters & Büchel (2010) notes that the effect might 
be “merely [because of] the fact that episodic information elicits richer associations and 
imagery, and it is this increased detail that improves valuation”. 
Dual process models of cognition have long emphasized the role of a slow, 
deliberative mode of thinking in decision-making (Kahneman, 2011), with the emphasis on 
how this mode can ‘overrule’ more ‘impulsive’ behaviour (for discussion and criticism see 
Koffarnus et al., 2013; Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018). Both of the above explanations about 
general deliberative thinking and general future orientation have received some support from 
studies suggesting that the effect of imagining the future on discounting appears to be 
relatively unrelated to some aspects of its content (e.g. imagining familiar vs. unfamiliar 
scenarios, Sasse, Peters, Büchel, & Brassen, 2015). However, this is contentious because 
other evidence suggests that the content does indeed matter (Daniel et al., 2016; Dassen, 
Page 24 of 57Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
DOI: 10.1177/1747021818819777
25
Jansen, Nederkoorn, & Houben, 2016), for instance with regards to its relevance to the 
respective decision or to one’s personal goals (O’Donnell, Oluyomi Daniel, & Epstein, 
2017). All three of the aforementioned studies were conducted with small sample sizes. 
However, if the findings reflect true effects, then it may be that there is a difference between 
the types of content assessed inasmuch as these differ in terms of the amount of deliberation 
they entail (e.g., personal goals and decision relevance may entail more deliberation than 
familiarity). Alternatively, as Schacter et al. (2017) argued: “The observation that the impact 
of episodic future thinking is contingent on the content of the imagined event indicates that it 
does not merely reflect a generic change in future orientation.”
Third, the possible effect of the content of future simulations may be due to its 
preparatory and motivational aspects (Benoit, Berkers, & Paulus, 2018; Boyer, 2008; Bulley 
et al., 2016). For example, Stein et al. (2017) have suggested that: “One interpretation of 
these findings is that [episodic foresight] broadens the temporal window over which 
individuals integrate the value of reinforcement, thus facilitating consideration of a 
behaviour’s negative, long-term outcomes (e.g., lung cancer from smoking).” This is in line 
with perspectives on episodic foresight that emphasize its ultimate goal-related functions (e.g. 
Cole & Berntsen, 2015; D’Argembeau, 2016), insofar as people’s personal goals often 
pertain to long-term outcomes for which reinforcement information is necessarily delayed. 
In the current experiment, it is possible that foreseeing a future threat event engaged 
preparatory motivation (Miloyan, Pachana, & Suddendorf, 2014; Miloyan & Suddendorf, 
2015). For instance, planning for a future hardship might encourage people to choose a larger 
later reward in order to have the appropriate resources available when needed to manage the 
future circumstance effectively. In this context, it may be informative to assess the 
controllability of imagined future events: if a future threat is perceived to be more 
controllable, then preparatory behaviour (choosing the larger, later reward) may be more 
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likely, whereas if the future threat is perceived to be outside of one’s control, perhaps this 
would encourage a preference for smaller sooner rewards, given that the preparatory or 
motivational rationale for waiting for the larger reward is thereby undercut (Pepper & Nettle, 
2014, 2017). 
A fourth possibility is that episodic event tagging during the task ‘primes’ people to 
think about the future, which leads to reduced discounting through an enhancement of 
choices in line with this prime. This is consistent with one study that showed scrambled-
sentence task priming of ‘future’ concepts reduced desires to engage in hedonic activities that 
have long term costs like excessive drinking (Cheng et al., 2012). However, there is evidence 
that the ability to create a coherent vivid mental scene is related to the strength of the episodic 
tagging effect (Peters & Büchel, 2010). Furthermore, older adults and people with amnesia, 
who show marked deficits in generating episodic detail do not appear to receive the effect of 
episodic event tagging during intertemporal choice (Palombo, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2016; 
Rosenbaum et al., 2015; Sasse, Peters, & Brassen, 2017) – though see Kwan et al. (2015) for 
some conflicting results in the context of hippocampal amnesia. Importantly, however, 
priming studies are being called into question due to repeated failures to replicate even well-
known priming effects (similar to the proposed one at hand) such as social and goal priming 
(e.g. Harris, Coburn, Rohrer, & Pashler, 2013; O’Donnell et al., 2018). 
A fifth possible explanation is that the apparent effects of episodic foresight on delay 
discounting are due to demand characteristics. In a recent study, Rung and Madden (2018) 
provided participants with vignettes of interactions between experimenters and subjects 
regarding a study of the association between episodic foresight and delay discounting. They 
found that most participants could guess the purpose of the study. This suggests that demand 
characteristics in such study designs may explain the apparent effect of episodic foresight on 
delay discounting. Note, however, that another recent study found that the results of the 
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episodic foresight manipulation on delay discounting (and cigarette demand) remained 
significant after controlling for measures of demand characteristics such as expectancies 
about the experimental hypotheses (Stein et al., 2017). We recommend that future studies 
control for demand characteristics by assessing whether participants are aware of the study 
hypotheses as a covariate. It will also be important to determine what potential demand 
effects are at play in the context of specific hypotheses about the role of episodic future event 
cuing such as the role of emotion studied here. 
Overall, it remains a challenge for future research to determine which of the above 
explanations is correct and in what circumstances they apply. One significant hurdle to 
overcome will be in accounting for (often subtle) differences between both the cuing 
manipulations - which vary in terms of key features such as whether or not participants are 
explicitly told that the imagination component of the task need not relate to the decision 
component – as well as the delay discounting tasks, which vary on dimensions including the 
magnitude of the rewards, time delays, and choice framing.  
No effect of future thinking on risk-taking
The current results revealed that the average number of balloon pumps in the BART 
was not significantly different between the three conditions. Thus, there was no evidence that 
imagining the future, with any emotional valence, affects risk-taking in this laboratory 
paradigm relative to neutral imagery. One explanation of these data is that episodic foresight 
does not necessarily have a blanket influence on all choice domains under the ‘impulsivity’ 
umbrella – i.e. those without an explicit long-term outcome structure such as the BART.  
While this is the first study to our knowledge to explore the effect of episodic cuing 
on behavioural risk taking in the BART, three previous studies have examined the effect of 
cued episodic foresight on risk preferences in the context of probability discounting and risky 
investing. Probability discounting tasks assess the extent to which participants discount the 
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subjective value of probabilistic outcomes (rather than delayed ones). Kaplan et al. (2016) 
assessed probability discounting of both gains and losses, and found that exposing people to 
age-progressed images of their own face (perhaps somewhat analogous to the episodic future 
event cuing) reduced this discounting. However, this study was conducted with only five 
participants in experiment one, and six participants in experiment two, presumably due to the 
difficulty of creating the age-progressed images of participants, and thus any inferences on 
the basis of this data are premature – as the authors acknowledge when they call the paper a 
‘proof of concept’. 
In a study by Monroe et al (2017), participants who wrote a letter to their ‘future self’ 
favoured significantly less risky investments than participants who wrote a letter about their 
current self, suggesting that thinking about the future may heighten aversion to potential loss 
when considering long-term investments. In Mok et al. (2017), episodic future event cuing 
(similar to the manipulation used in the present study) did not affect probability discounting, 
but did reduce delay discounting. These results are consistent with the current null effects of 
future episodic event cuing on behavioural risk-taking, as well as the interpretation that 
cueing episodic future events is not sufficient to influence all tasks that assess aspects of 
impulsivity. As mentioned earlier, this is probably due to the fact that impulsivity is a highly 
multidimensional construct. Indeed, it is unclear how the BART as an index relates precisely 
to other risk elicitation methods such as probability discounting (for review see Charness, 
Gneezy, & Imas, 2013). 
It will be important to consider the potentially selective (domain specific) effects of 
episodic foresight in the development of cognitive and behavioural strategies that have future 
imagination at their core (Snider et al., 2016). Clinical translation of recent findings about the 
potentially causal role of foresight in decision-making will require appropriate caution given 
concerns regarding the potential for demand characteristics to explain these effects (Rung & 
Page 28 of 57Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
DOI: 10.1177/1747021818819777
29
Madden, 2018). The present findings are potentially in line with the idea that demand 
characteristics contributed to the effect of cued episodic foresight on decision-making, given 
that the manipulation only affected choice impulsivity domains with an explicit intertemporal 
trade-off, and not risk-taking – which lacks an explicit time component; and given that there 
was no temporal component in the neutral condition event cues for either task. Note, 
however, that there are other plausible reasons why we did not observe an effect of positive 
and negative foresight on risk-taking (e.g. due to the influence of unmeasured moderating 
variables such as the perceived ‘controllability’ of the simulated events), and identifying 
these reasons should be an avenue for future research. For instance, future research could 
directly modify the timing of outcomes in a risk-taking task with episodic future event cuing 
to explore whether decisions pertaining to short-term consequences (such as in the BART) 
differ in their susceptibility to cuing relative to long term consequences (such as in the 
Monroe et al. (2017) investment study that found reduced risk-taking after cuing future-
oriented cognition). 
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to the current study that should be acknowledged. 
Firstly, there may have been an unintended effect of repeated simulation, for instance on the 
estimated likelihood of the events happening (Szpunar & Schacter, 2013). Relatedly, it is also 
possible that the act of repeated simulation caused participants to reduce their engagement in 
vivid imagination or to habituate to the emotional content therein. However we did 
counterbalance the BART and the intertemporal choice task, so any between-task 
consequences of this reduction in episodic simulation detail with time should not have 
influenced the key contrasts of interest. Secondly, ratings of episodic simulations in response 
to the event cues were measured after the tasks were completed, meaning they were reliant on 
participant’s recollection of their previous simulations, and may have therefore been more 
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erroneous than immediate ratings. In the same vein, other than verbal self-report there is no 
way to verify that participants are actually following the task instructions and engaging in 
episodic foresight when cued due to the subjective nature of the manipulation. Thirdly, 
demand characteristics may have played a role in the findings, as discussed above (Rung & 
Madden, 2018). Lastly, it is also relevant to note that the intertemporal choices were 
hypothetical. Although there is generally good correspondence between real and hypothetical 
rewards in decision-making tasks (Lagorio & Madden, 2005; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & 
Kastern, 2003), there are also important differences that should be considered (Camerer & 
Mobbs, 2017; Xu et al., 2016). Incidentally, the use of hypothetical rewards also limits the 
relevance of comparisons with non-human animals, who almost always actually experience 
the delays and receive the rewards when performing intertemporal choice tasks (see 
discussion in Palombo, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2015; and Redshaw & Bulley, 2018). Future 
studies of the role of foresight in tasks such as the ‘experiential discounting task’, in which 
delays are actually experienced, will be informative (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004). Finally, 
the relatively homogenous nature of our sample restricts the generalizability of our findings 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), as well as that of the majority of previous studies of 
the effect of foresight on delay discounting. This is particularly important in addressing any 
evolutionary claims about the potential adaptive function of episodic foresight in modulating 
decision-making. 
Conclusions
To make decisions with outcomes that play out over time, humans can use 
information derived from mental simulations of possible futures. The present study adds to a 
body of research demonstrating plasticity in intertemporal decision-making in response to 
such mental simulations of the future. We found that cuing the imagination of positive and 
negative future events, regardless of the affective content of these events, reduced delay 
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discounting relative to control imagery. However, cued positive and negative episodic 
foresight had no effect on risk-taking in a standard laboratory task. These results thereby 
replicate previous findings suggesting positive foresight can reduce discounting, but are 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that anticipating a generally threatening future event would 
encourage a greater preference for immediate rewards, as reported in two previous studies. 
Finally, the present results suggest that the effect of foresight on ‘impulsive’ decision-making 
is selective, insofar as it operates on delay discounting but not risk-taking. 
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. (A): Trial order in the MCQ – Intertemporal choice task question with preceding 
episodic foresight event cue instructions. (B): Trial order in the BART – Participants were 
presented with a future event before moving to each subsequent balloon.
Figure 2. Post-task event cue ratings. Top: Correlation matrix heat-maps of imagery ratings 
for each condition. Darker red means a larger positive correlation and darker blue means a 
larger negative correlation. Valence is scored from 1-7 such that low scores equate to 
negative valence and high scores equate to positive valence. All correlations: p < 0.01.  
Middle: Event cue ratings of imagery vividness, valence, and personal relevance for each 
condition. Boxplot midline represents median. *** = Significant at p < 0.001. Horizontal 
jitter and some minor vertical jitter (<0.01 on Y-axis) have been added to aid in 
discrimination between data-points. Bottom: Relationships between event cue ratings of 
imagery vividness and valence in each condition.
Figure 3. Top left: MCQ log k values by experimental condition. Top middle: MCQ 
proportion (larger, later choices) by experimental condition. Top right: BART adjusted pump 
scores by experimental condition. In each plot, boxplot midline represents median. *** = 
Significant at p < 0.001. Horizontal jitter and some minor vertical jitter (<0.01 on Y-axis) 
have been added to aid in discrimination between data-points. Bottom. Proportion of group 
who chose the smaller, sooner reward rather than the later, larger reward at each k-value of 
the MCQ. For a question with a higher k-value rank, more participants are expected to choose 
the larger, later reward – for example, the following choice has a k-value rank of 9: “$31 
now, or $85 in 7 days”. At each k-value rank, the presented proportion includes the 
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participants’ responses to three questions from the questionnaire. The proportions are plotted 
separately for each experimental condition.
Page 48 of 57Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
DOI: 10.1177/1747021818819777
Table 1. 
Event cues used in the experiment and their respective ANEW valence mean and SD. 
The highlighted word is the keyword from the ANEW list around which the event was 
constructed. 
Positive (Mean, SD) Negative (Mean, SD) Neutral (Mean, SD)
Dinner party 7.16 (1.50) Getting sick 1.90 (1.14) Using a pencil 5.22 (0.68) 
Visiting loved ones 8.64 (0.71) Traffic accident 2.05 (1.19) Leaning on a table 5.22 (0.72) 
Going on holiday 7.55 (2.14) Hurt by animal 1.90 (1.26) Using a bowl 5.33 (1.33) 
Birthday party 7.84 (1.92) Injury after falling 2.49 (1.76) Entering a building 5.29 (1.15) 
Seeing live music 8.13 (1.09) Getting an infection 1.93 (1.87) Opening a cabinet 5.05 (0.31) 
Success at university 8.29 (0.93) Assault by stranger 2.03 (1.55) Sitting on a chair 5.08 (0.98) 
Going to the beach 8.03 (1.59) Food poisoning 1.98 (1.44) Picking up some scissors 5.05 (0.96) 
Hanging out with friends 7.18 (1.07) Seeing an intruder 2.77 (2.32) Holding a hammer 4.88 (1.16) 
Winning an award 8.38 (0.92) Burn on hand 2.73 (1.72) Opening curtains 4.83 (0.83) 
Spending time in nature 7.65 (1.37) Venomous bite 2.68 (1.81) Folding up paper 5.33 (1.37)
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Table 2. Summary of the 27 monetary choice questions in the MCQ sorted by delay 
(long to short). The shading of the delay column represents the groupings used in the 
episodic foresight task to produce event cues with delays approximating those of the 
choice questions. The first column presents the order of choice presentations. Each 
question is assigned a rank based on its k-index. The final column presents the 
magnitude grouping of the monetary amount offered in the corresponding choice (S = 
small, M = medium, L = large). Table based on Lemley et al, (2016) and Kirby 
(1999).
Monetary choice options
Order Today  Delayed Delay k-index Rank Magnitude
13 $34 or $35 186 0.00016 1 S
20 $28 or $30 179 0.0004 2 S
9 $78 or $80 162 0.00016 1 L
6 $47 or $50 160 0.0004 2 M
17 $80 or $85 157 0.0004 2 L
26 $22 or $25 136 0.001 3 S
12 $67 or $75 119 0.001 3 L
1 $54 or $55 117 0.00016 1 M
24 $54 or $60 111 0.001 3 M
15 $69 or $85 91 0.0025 4 L
16 $49 or $60 89 0.0025 4 M
22 $25 or $30 80 0.0025 4 S
10 $40 or $55 62 0.006 5 M
2 $55 or $75 61 0.006 5 L
3 $19 or $25 53 0.006 5 S
21 $34 or $50 30 0.016 6 M
25 $54 or $80 30 0.016 6 L
18 $24 or $35 29 0.016 6 S
14 $27 or $50 21 0.041 7 M
23 $41 or $75 20 0.041 7 L
5 $14 or $25 19 0.041 7 S
19 $33 or $80 14 0.1 8 L
8 $25 or $60 14 0.1 8 M
7 $15 or $35 13 0.1 8 S
11 $11 or $30 7 0.25 9 S
27 $20 or $55 7 0.25 9 M
4 $31 or $85 7 0.25 9 L
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for study variables overall (n=297) and by experimental condition. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; MCQ 
proportion (LL) = proportion of larger, later rewards chosen in the Monetary Choice Questionnaire; PSWQ = Penn-state worry questionnaire; 
PHQ-9 = Patient health questionnaire 9; BIS-Brief = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-Brief. 
Overall (N = 297) Neutral (N = 101) Positive (N = 99) Negative (N = 97)
Mean (SD) Min – max (range) Mean (SD) Min – max (range) Mean (SD) Min – max (range) Mean (SD) Min – max (range)
Age 19.72 (4.03) 17.00 – 50.00 (33.00) 19.66 (4.03) 17.00 – 50.00 (33.00) 19.56 (3.46) 17.00 – 42.00 (25.00) 19.96 (4.56) 17.00 – 45.00 (28.00)
Affect (VAS) 6.96 (1.62) 1.00 – 10.00 (9.00) 6.98 (1.81) 2.00 – 10.00 (8.00) 6.99 (1.38) 3.00 – 10.00 (7.00) 6.90 (1.66) 1.00 – 10.00 (9.00)
MCQ k value 0.01 (0.03) 0.00 – 0.25 (0.25) 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 – 0.10 (0.10) 0.01 (0.03) 0.00 – 0.25 (0.25) 0.01 (0.03) 0.00 – 0.20 (0.20)
MCQ proportion (LL) 0.50 (0.17) 0.00 – 1.00 (1.00) 0.45 (0.14) 0.15 – 1.00 (0.85) 0.55 (0.18) 0.00 – 1.00 (1.00) 0.52 (0.16) 0.11 – 0.96 (0.85)
MCQ log k -2.20 (0.60) -3.80 – -0.60 (3.19) -1.99 (0.50) -3.80 – -1.00 (2.80) -2.35 (0.64) -3.80 – -0.60 (3.19) -2.28 (0.61) -3.80 –  -0.70 (3.09)
BART Adjusted Pumps 29.56 (11.98) 4.17 – 64.21 (60.04) 30.70 (12.01) 8.00 – 59.19 (51.19) 30.07 (11.39) 7.79 – 64.21 (56.42) 27.87 (12.46) 4.17 – 53.06 (48.89)
Worry (PSWQ) 55.42 (12.76) 18.00 – 80.00 (62.00) 55.33 (12.85) 21.00 – 78.00 (57.00) 54.51 (13.80) 18.00 – 80.00 (62.00) 56.44 (11.54) 33.00 – 79.00 (46.00)
Depression (PHQ-9) 7.43 (4.96) 0.00 – 24.00 (24.00) 7.46 (4.95) 0.00 – 24.00 (24.00) 7.08 (4.72) 0.00 – 22.00 (22.00) 7.76 (5.22) 0.00 – 24.00 (24.00)
Impulsivity (BIS-Brief) 16.38 (3.58) 8.00 – 29.00 (21.00) 16.28 (3.47) 10.00 – 25.00 (15.00) 16.74 (3.37) 8.00 – 27.00 (19.00) 16.11 (3.89) 8.00 – 29.00 (21.00)
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Table 4.  
Descriptive statistics for event cue ratings in the neutral (n=101), positive (n=99) and 
negative (n=97) experimental conditions.
Mean SD Min Max Range
Neutral 
      Vividness 5.38 0.93 2.00 6.80 4.80
      Valence 4.48 0.58 3.40 6.40 3.00
      Personal relevance 5.10 1.16 1.00 7.00 6.00
Positive 
      Vividness 5.38 0.85 3.00 7.00 4.00
      Valence 5.88 0.67 4.00 7.00 3.00
      Personal relevance 5.62 0.73 2.80 7.00 4.20
Negative 
      Vividness 5.16 0.90 2.40 6.80 4.40
      Valence 2.37 0.70 1.00 5.00 4.00
      Personal relevance 4.65 0.95 2.00 6.40 4.40
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Table 5.
Results of the multiple linear regression model assessing experimental condition as a predictor of log MCQ k values as the criterion, adjusting 
for age, sex, and baseline affect. Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is 
also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. LL and UL indicate the lower 
and upper limits of the confidence intervals, respectively.
 
Predictor b
b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
sr2 Fit
(Intercept) -1.79** [-2.25, -1.33]
Age -0.00 [-0.02, 0.02] .00
Sex: male 0.14 [-0.00, 0.28] .01
Baseline affect -0.03 [-0.07, 0.01] .01
Condition: positive -0.36** [-0.52, -0.19] .06
Condition: negative -0.29** [-0.45, -0.13] .04
R2   = .088**
95% CI [.02, .14]
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Table 6. 
Results of the multiple linear regression model assessing experimental condition as a predictor of BART adjusted pumps as the criterion, 
adjusting for age, sex, and baseline affect. Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial 
correlation is also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights; sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. LL and UL 
indicate the lower and upper limits of the confidence intervals, respectively.
 
Predictor b
b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
sr2 Fit
(Intercept) 22.95** [13.50, 32.40]
Age 0.16 [-0.18, 0.50] .00
Sex: male 1.24 [-1.69, 4.16] .00
Baseline affect 0.60 [-0.24, 1.45] .01
Condition: positive -0.62 [-3.95, 2.71] .00
Condition: negative -2.84 [-6.18, 0.51] .01
R2   = .022
95% CI [.00, .05]
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